In re Marriage of Oliverez - Trial Court Erred In Reconsidering Another Court’s Order 3 Years Later

In re Marriage of Oliverez (2015) __, Cal.App.__, Case No. H040955, involves a dissolution action between Appellant Donna Oliverez (Donna) and Respondent Mark Oliverez (Mark).  Mark contended that they had reached a marital settlement agreement, but Donna disputed this and contended it was merely a proposed settlement agreement (hereafter "the Agreement"). Mark filed a motion to enforce judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.  The trial court denied the motion, finding the Agreement unenforceable. Thereafter, the case was reassigned to a different trial court judge. After a trial on the merits, the court reconsidered and vacated the first trial judge's finding that the Agreement was unenforceable. Donna appealed. 

A trial court's discretion to reconsider another judge's prior ruling is necessarily narrow and usually only appropriate when the prior judge is unavailable.  (Curtin v. Koskey (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 873, 876-878 (Curtin).)  

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 governs parties' motions for reconsideration and their renewal of prior motions.  It expressly specifies and limits the court's jurisdiction to reconsider a prior ruling or to entertain a renewed motion when such relief is sought by a party.  A motion for reconsideration by a party must be filed within "10 days after service upon the party of written notice of the entry of the order" and the motion may be granted only "upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law," which matters must be shown by affidavit as part of the motion.  (§ 1008, subd. (a).)  Section 1008 governs parties' motions for reconsideration or their renewal of a prior motion "whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final."  (§ 1008, subd. (e).)

In Le Francois,  the California Supreme Court considered whether, notwithstanding the provisions of section 1008, a trial court may "reconsider interim orders it has already made in the absence of new facts or new law [.]"  (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094,  1101 (La Francois).)  In that case, the defendants brought a renewed motion for summary judgment based on the same grounds as their first motion.  Vacating the prior ruling of the first trial judge, a second trial judge granted the renewed motion for summary judgment.  (Id. at p. 1097.)  The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the defendants did not meet the statutory requirements for a motion for reconsideration.  (Id. at p. 1109.) However, the court interpreted section 1008 "as imposing a limitation on the parties' ability to file repetitive motions, but not on the court's authority to reconsider its prior interim rulings on its own motion."  (Id. at p. 1105, fn. omitted.)  Thus, if the statutory requirements under section 1008 are not met, "any action to reconsider a prior interim order must formally begin with the court on its own motion."  (Id. at p. 1108.)  Here, the trial court, in its "Tentative Ruling on Court Trial," and later by formal notice, stated that it would reconsider the prior order on the Agreement on its own motion.  Thus, although the trial court did not consider any new facts or new law, under Le Francois, it had the inherent authority to reconsider a prior interim order.  (Ibid.)

However, Le Francois did not resolve the question of whether one trial judge may reverse the ruling of another trial judge.  In Le Francois, the Supreme Court noted that the "Court of Appeal held that because the motion was transferred [to another judge] without objection, plaintiffs could not challenge the propriety of that transfer on appeal."  (Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1097, fn. 2 (italics added).)  The question of "when and under what circumstances one judge may revisit a ruling of another judge" was thus not on review, and the Supreme Court specifically left open that question.  (Ibid.)

Generally, one trial court judge may not reconsider and overrule an interim ruling of another trial judge.  (Curtin, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d 873; Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232 (Ziller); Morite of California v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 485, 493.)  "This principle is founded on the inherent difference between a judge and a court and is designed to ensure the orderly administration of justice. 'If the rule were otherwise, it would be only a matter of days until we would have a rule of man rather than a rule of law.  To affirm the action taken in this case would lead directly to forum shopping, since if one judge should deny relief, defendants would try another and another judge until finally they found one who would grant what they were seeking.  Such a procedure would instantly breed lack of confidence in the integrity of the courts.'  [Citation.]"  (In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 427.)  "For one superior court judge, no matter how well intended, even if correct as a matter of law, to nullify a duly made, erroneous ruling of another superior court judge places the second judge in the role of a one-judge appellate court."  (Ibid.)

However, there are narrow exceptions to this general rule.  (See In re Alberto, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 430.)  "[W]here the judge who made the initial ruling is unavailable to reconsider the motion, a different judge may entertain the reconsideration motion."  (Ziller, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1232.)  Another exception is when the facts have changed or when the judge has considered further evidence and law.  (People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 992-993 (Riva); Tilem v. City of Los Angeles (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 694, 706.)  Additionally, a second judge may reverse a prior ruling of another judge if the record shows that it was based on inadvertence, mistake, or fraud.  (Church of Scientology v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1069 (Armstrong).)  Mere disagreement, as here, with the prior trial judge's ruling, however, is not enough to overturn that ruling.  (Riva, supra, at p. 992.)  

No exception was established here.  Additionally, the appellate court found that not only was the decision to overrule the prior ruling erroneous, but it also resulted in prejudice to Donna.  The decision to overrule the first court’s decision came three years after the original ruling.  As a consequence, both parties continued to litigate many of the issues that had been addressed in the Agreement over the course of three years, conducted a 15-day trial, and expended considerable time and resources.  The parties did so in reliance on the original ruling that the terms of the Agreement were unenforceable.  This reliance was reasonable.  (Cf. Greene v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1583, 1592.  

Therefore, the appellate court held that  under the circumstances of this case, once the court had determined that the Agreement was unenforceable, Donna had the right to believe the ruling was definitive.  It follows that the reconsideration of the prior ruling on the Agreement resulted in unfairness to Donna and the case is reversed and remanded.