Irwin J. Siegel (Irwin) and Linda S. Siegel (Linda), now in their early 80’s, divorced in 1987. In 2013, Linda wanted to check to make certain that Irwin was complying with their marital termination agreement, which merged into a judgment, and required Irwin to establish a life insurance trust for Linda, subject to certain terms. Linda filed a Request for Order to Disclose Insurance Information, asking for a court order requiring Irwin to provide "proof" that the insurance policy was in existence. Irwin filed a Responsive Declaration consenting to disclose information about his existing life insurance for Linda's benefit, attached some documents, but did not appear at the hearing.
At the hearing, the family court judge construed the Request for Order To Disclose Insurance Information as a motion to enforce the marital termination agreement and issued an order after the hearing which, among other things, required Irwin to establish a $126,916.00 trust with Linda as the beneficiary. Irwin appealed, asserting that he was denied due process because the trial court's orders exceeded the relief requested by Linda in the Request for Orders and he had inadequate notice of the relief and that the family court impermissibly modified a judgment that was nonmodifiable on its terms.
On appeal, Irwin argued that he was denied due process because the court held a hearing and made orders on issues about which he had no notice. Irwin challenged the family court's authority to issue orders beyond the scope of the notice. This raised a question of law which the court reviews de novo. (Herbst v. Swan (2002) 102 Cal. App. 4th 813, 816[citations omitted].
" 'It is a fundamental concept of due process that a judgment against a defendant cannot be entered unless he was given proper notice and an opportunity to defend. (U.S. Const., [Amend.] XIV . . . .)' (In re Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal. 3d. 1160, 1166 [(Lippel)].) . . . [A] dissolution court cannot grant unrequested relief against a party who appears without affording that party notice and an opportunity to respond. [Citations.] Due process requires affording a litigant a reasonable opportunity, by continuance or otherwise, to respond to evidence or argument that is new, surprising, and relevant. [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of O'Connell (1992) 8 Cal.App. 4th 565, 574.)
Here, the written Request for Orders sought "proof . . . that this [insurance] policy is or ever was in existence," and an order that the court "will insist on that proof." Irwin filed a response which indicated his written consent to this order. The transcript of the {Slip Opn. Page 10} brief hearing, is summarized above, speaks for itself. The Family Law court, on its own volition, chose to treat the Request for Orders as more than an Order to Disclose Insurance Information, and awarded relief far in excess of what was sought.
The Court of Appeal agreed with Irwin that the trial court erred by issuing an order that far exceeded the relief requested by Linda, and reversed.
copyright © 2015 Christine Esser
The information contained here is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice or a substitute for legal counsel. Online readers should not act upon this information without seeking professional counsel. Information on this blog is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship between you and Christine Esser. An attorney-client relationship is only established when a written retainer has been signed
Disclosure: If you click on the lin below, you will be directed to the Amazon website. We may receive a small commission but this will not increase the amount you pay. Check out the great deals today before they are gone.
No comments:
Post a Comment